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I I Agreements as addendums as noted on line 13, page 1 of said Agreements. (R. Ex. 2, ¶q[ 
! 
I 
I 
; 
4, 6). 
Callies and CPM filed suit on October 3, 2006 against a myriad of defendants, 
I. S T A T E m N T  OF THE CASE 
1. Nature qf the Case. 
This case is an appeal from orders of the trial court granting Respondents Charter 
Builders, Inc., Charter Pointe Apartments, LLC and Silver Oaks, LLC's (collectively 
"CBI") motion for summary judgment on Appellants Complete Property Management 
and Investment Realty, Inc. and Tricia Callies' (hereinafter collectively "CPM) claims 
for unpaid coim~ssions by CBI, due to the lack of a legally enforceable description of 
the properties on the listing agreements. 
This appeal presents issues governed by existing legal principles. This case does 
NOT involve issues of substantial public interest, matters of first impression, issues of 
constitutional interpretation, questions of validity of statutes or ordinances, or any 
inconsistency in decisions of the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. 
ii. Course of Proceedings 
On or about March 1, 2005, CPM, and the Respondent, CBI, as managing 
member of Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, executed two RE-16 Exclusive Seller 
Representation Agreements (hereinafter "Agreements"); one for the property owned by 
Charter Pointe and one for the property owned by Silver Oaks. (R. Ex. 2, q[q[ 3,s). At the 
time of execution of the Agreements there was no legal description attached to the 
I I including CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, in the Fourth Judicial District in the State I I of Idaho, County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 0618504. (R., Vol. I, pp. 20-29). On 
Page 1 
1 1  Idaho, County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 0620977, against CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver 
1 
Oaks, among other parties, seeking to recover commissions CPM claims they were owed. 
November 8, 2006 CPM filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the State of 
I/ (R., Vof. I., pp. 78-117). On November 16, 2006, CBI filed an answer and counterclaim 
j 
7 
against CPM and Callies in Case No. CV OC 0618504, seeking a declaratory judgment as 
to the validity of the Agreements. (R., Vol. I, pp. 30-55). Those two cases were later 
3 
f 
) 
consolidated with a third separate action pending simultaneously. (R. Vol. I, pp. 6, 64, 
77). 
! 
On April 18, 2007, CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed a motion for 
summary judgment, moving the court to declare the listing agreements invalid for lack of 
a legal description. (R., Vol. I, pp. 122-125; R., Vol. TI, Ex. 1). The court heard oral 
argument by the parties on July 18, 2007 and entered an order on August 31, 2007, 
granting summary judgment in favor of CBI, CPA and Silver Oaks and declaring the 
listing agreements invalid for lack of an accurate legal description. (R. Voi. I, pp. 302- 
3 18). This appeal followed. 
In the memorandum opinion on the motion for summary judgment, Judge Sticklen 
found: the identity aid exact boundaries of the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks properties 
cannot be determined from the face of the listing agreements; the listing agreements 
erroneously stated that the legal descriptions were attached, when in fact no such 
descriptions were affixed; and that construing controlling Idaho law, the legal 
descriptions failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and failed to satisfy LC. 5 54- 
2050(1)(b). (R. Vol. I, pp. 302-318). 
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I 
I/ on January 28, 2008, appealing the Trial court's decision regarding the validity of the 
An Amended Judgment and I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certificate were entered on December 
I 
3 
! 
19, 2007, rendering judgment in favor of the CBI as to CPM's claims for unpaid 
connnissions. (R., Vol. 11, pp. 325-329). CPM, through Callies, filed a Notice of Appeal 
i Agreements. (R., Vol. 11, pp. 330-335). 
iii. Statement of Facts 
I 
I 
1 
property owned by Charter Pointe and one for the property owned by Silver Oaks. (R. 
Ex. 2, g[m 3-6, Exs. A-B). The Agreements, identical in form, both stated that a "Legal 
Description [was] Attached as addendum # 1" and added that the "[a]ddendnm must 
accompany original listing." (R. Ex. 2, ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-B). At the time of execution of 
In March of 2005, CBI was the managing member of Charter Pointe and Silver 
Oaks and had the authority to make business decisions and act as an agent for those 
' 
the Agreements, a legal description was not attached to either of the Agreements, and 
instead the properties were described as "TBD Charter Pointe" in the Charter Pointe 
companies. (R. Ex. 2, ¶q[ 3,5). On or about March 1,2005, CPM and CBI executed two 
RE-16 Exclusive Seller Representation Agreements (the "Agreements"); one for the 
Agreement and "TBD Ten MileFranklin" in the Silver Oaks Agreement. (R. Ex. 2, 3- 
6, Exs. A-B). 
On or about March 8, 2005, CBI executed the closi~lg papers for the acquisition of 
properties which are the subject matter of the Agreements. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 7, Ex. C). The 
closing papers for those properties contained only a proposed legal description of the 
properties. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 7, Ex. C). A final legal description was not recorded for Charter 
Pointe until April 11, 2006, when the Declaration of Covenants for Charter Pointe 
Page 3 
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Village 4-Plex Condominiums was recorded with the Ada County Recorder. (R. Ex. 2, rn 
8, Ex. D). The final legal description contained in that document for CPA was created 
after March 8,2005. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 8, Ex. D). 
Callies filed a NOTICE OF OBLIGATION TO PAY COMNIISSIONS 
(hereinafter "Notice") dated June 7, 2006, subscribed and sworn to by Callies, and 
recorded said notice as Instrument No. 106091057. (R. Ex. 3, ¶ 3, Ex. A). The Notice 
incorporates the Charter Pointe Agreement. (R. Ex. 3, rn 3, Ex. A). The incorporated 
listing agreement also had no "Legal Description Attached as addendum #I.'' (R. Ex. 3, 
3, EX. A). 
On August 16, 2006, Callies, through her agent Taryn Dolan, requested via 
facsimile that the legal description for the Silver Oaks Agreement be "added" to that 
Agreement. (R. Ex. 2, q[ 9, Ex. E). On August 30,2006, Callies, through her agent Taryn 
Dolan, requested via facsimile that the legal description for the CPA Agreement be 
"added" to that Agreement. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 10, Ex. F). At no time did CBI, Charter Pointe 
or Silver Oaks consent to the legal descriptions being added to the Agreements. (R. Ex. 
2,419[ 9-10). 
In October of 2006, Callies sent a demand letter to CBI, which made reference to 
"[tlhe legal description relative to the Silver Oaks listing agreement appears to have been 
provided seven days after the listing agreement was executed." (R. Ex. 3, q[ 4, Ex. B). 
Further, the verified complaint filed by CPM on November 8, 2006 unequivocally states 
that "[all the time of the initial listing for the Charter Point (sic) properties, a final plat 
had not yet been recorded wluch delineated the separate four-plexes I.. .I" (R., Vol. I, p. 
80). 
Page 4 
CBI? 
(2) Did the trial court err when it concluded that the Agreements were 
! 
I 
, 
II unenforceable due to the lack of a valid and enforceable legal descriptioll of the 
CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed a motion for summary judgment on 
April 18,2007, seeking to have the Agreements declared invalid due to the lack of a valid 
and enforceable legal description in the Agreements. (R., Vol. I., pp. 122-125). The 
Trial court heard oral argument by the parties on July 3, 2007. (R., Vol. I., p. 10). In its 
opinion filed August 3 1, 2007, the Court held that the Agreements were invalid due to the 
lack of a legally enforceable legal description and that CPM was not entitled to recover 
under the theories of quasi estoppel or partial performance due to the fact that the 
underlying agreements were unenforceable. (R., Vol. II., pp. 302-3 18). 
2. ISSUES PRESENTED O N  APPEAL 
(1) Did the trial court err in finding that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact which would have precluded the court from entering summary judgment in favor of 
respective properties to be sold on the Agreements? 
(3) Was it in error for the trial court to rely on LC. $ 9-503 and I.C. $ 54-2050 
when determining whether the Agreements were valid contractual agreements? 
(4) Did the trial court err in its holding that CPM was not entitled to recover 
under the theories of quasi estoppel or partial performance due to the unenforceability of 
the underlying Agreements? 
(5) Should the Court award CBI reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in 
this appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 41, I.A.R. 40, Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) and Idaho Code $ 
12-l21? 
Page 5 
11 When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for suinrnary judgment, the 
II the motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 
3 
4 
6 11 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997) (citing Thnmon v Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 
same standard is employed as that employed by the trial court when originally ruling on 
' 11887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994)))). "Suinmary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings. 
l1 I as a matter of law."' Id. (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). "The moving party is entitled to a 
8 
9 
10 
l2 1 1  judgment when the non-moving party 'fails to make a showing sufficient to establish h e  
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
l6 1 1  1273 (2007) (citing Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000)). 
13 
14 
15 
$7  //"The standard for reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is 
existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial."' Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 
la //free review. however [the] Court is bound by the same standards that control the district 
21 II East LizardButte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681, 837 P.2d 805,807 (1992)). 
19 
20 
22 114. ARGUMENT 
court's decision." Lloyd v. DeMott, 124 Idaho 62, 65, 856 P.2d 99, 102 (1993) (citing 
26 1 1  CPM, in their brief, attempt to divert attention from the relevant facts in the 
23 
24 
25 
27 I/record. specifically that the Agreements are void for lack of a legally enforceable 
I. The Trial Court Was Correct When it Held There Was No Genuine 
Issue of Material Fact In the Record Which Would Have Precluded 
the Court From Granting Summary Judgment. 
/description of the properties, by highlighting irrelevant disputed facts in the record. CBI 
29 
Page 6 
A contract which is rendered ambiguous due to the lack of a valid and enforceable 
legal description will not have the same standard applied as do other ambiguous contracts 
and thus, extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to claify the terms of such au 
agreement. White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 3, 644 P.2d 323, 325 (1982). Although the 
agreement at issue in White was for the transfer of property, as compared to the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3 
> 
) 
I 
' 
I 
Agreements at dispute here, both still require a legal description of the property they 
contemplate. That description must be able to sufficiently identify the property without 
resorting to parol evidence to determine intent of the parties. "The description [cannot 
be] so inadequate that to allow parol evidence and the surrounding circumstances to be 
considered would be to supply a description of the property which was omitted from the 
writing in order to ascertain and locate the land about which the parties negotiated." Id. 
What CPM and Callies do is collfuse alteration and modification wit11 formation. An 
is not arguing that there are no disputed facts in the record. Rather, those disputed facts 
are not material to the court's decision. The applicable statute requires that a brokerage 
representation agreement/commission agreement be written and contain a legally 
enforceable description of the property being sold. LC. § 54-2050(1)(b). 
There is no dispute in the record that the Agreements did not contain a valid or 
enforceable legal description at the time they were entered into. It is clear from the 
record that the only descriptions given of the properties contemplated by the Agreements 
were "TED Charter Pointe" and "TED Ten MileIFranklin." (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, ¶m 3, 5, 
Exs. A-B). It is also clear from the record that CBI at no time agreed to add legal 
descriptions to the Agreements subsequent to their execution. (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, qIgI 9- 
10). These are the only facts that are relevant to the dispute at hand. 
Page 7 
unenforceable agreement cannot be modified, as formation is lacking. White v. Rehn, 
644 P.2d 323. 
Further, a party has the right to rescind an agreement that is unenforceable. Good 
v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Idaho App.,1986). There is undisputed 
evidence in the record that the legal descriptions were not included or attached to the 
Agreements, nor had they even been created at the time of execution of the Agreements. 
(R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, g[g[ 3, 5, Exs. A-B; R., Vol. LI, Ex. 2, ¶9[ 9-10; R. Vol. I, p. 80-81,9(g[ 11, 
16). There is also undisputed evidence in the record that shows an agent of Callies' and 
3 M ' s  requested that those legal descriptions be added to the Agreements in August of 
2006. (R., Vol. TI, Ex. 2, ¶g[ 9-10). Even if the Agreements could have been made 
 fo force able by later addition of the legal descriptions, the record is clear that CBI did not 
iuthorize the addition of the legal descriptions to the Agreements subsequent to their 
txecution. (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, g[g[ 9-10). Therefore, as described in further detail below, 
here is no relevant issue of material fact that would have precluded the trial court from 
:ranting the CBI's motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the 
igreements due to the lack of valid and enforceable legal descriptions. 
The facts surrounding the execution of the Agreements and the fact that those 
igreements did not contain a legally enforceable description of the Charter Pointe and 
:ilver Oaks properties are the only pertinent facts that should be afforded any 
xamination for purposes of this appeal. They are also the only facts that should be 
xamined to determine the appropriateness of the trial court's ruling that summary 
~dgment should have been granted to CBI, deeming the Agreements unenforceable. 
age 8 
I 
2 
II Bartschi, 139 Idal~o 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003), and further argue that LC. 5 9-508 is the 
ii. Idaho Code $ 54-2050 is the Controlling Statute Regarding the 
Sufficiency of Brokerage Representation Agreements, is Unambiguous 
and ShouPd Be Interpreted as the Legislature Intended 
3 
4 
I1 controlling statute for purposes of this appeal. Idaho Code 5 9-508 states: 
CPM argues that the trial court erred when it applied the analysis of Garner v. 
REAL ESTATE COMMISSION CONTRACTS TO BE IN WRTTING. 
No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value, as 
and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one person 
of a purchaser of real estate of another shall be valid ullless the same shall 
be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal, 
appointed and duly qualified representative. 
I.C. 9 9-508 was originally codified in 1919, and was the colltrolling statute in the 
l3  I1 analysis of Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306,442 P.2d 442 (1968), the 
rn / I  case most heavily relied upon by CPM; 
l5  /I However, the Idaho State legislature enacted the Idaho Real Estate License Law 
I8 II 54-2001 et seq. LC. 5 54-2050 specifically identifies those requirements as follows: 
16 
17 
BROKERAGE REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS -- REQUIRED 
ELEMENTS. All real estate brokerage representation agreements, 
whether with a buyer or seller, inust be in writing in the manner required 
by section 54-2085, Idaho Code, and must contain the following contract 
provisions: (1) Seller representation agreements. Each seller 
representation agrecment, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, inust 
contain the following provisions: (a) Conspicuous and definite beginning 
and expiration dates; (b) A legally enforceable description of the 
property; (c) price and terms; (d) All fees or commissions; and (e) The 
signature of the owner of the real estate or the owner's legal, appointed 
and duly qualified representative, and the date of such signature. (3) 
Prohibited provisions aud exceptions -- Automatic renewal clauses. No 
buyer or seller representation agreement shall contain a provision 
requiring the party signing the agreement to notify the broker of the 
party's intention to cancel the agreement after the definite expiration date, 
unless the representation agreement states that it is completely 
in 2000, which created additional requirements for a valid brokerage agreement. LC. 5 
29 
Page 9 
according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings." 107 Idaho 688, 690, 692 P.2d 
I 
332, 334 (1984) (ovenuled on other grounds) (citations omitted). This Court went 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
3 
3 
further to state that it would "not construe a statute in a way which makes mere 
sulplusage of the provisions included therein." Id. (citations omitted). However, that is 
exactly what CPM is requesting of the Supreme Court. 
The language of LC. $ 54-2050 is clear and unambiguous. It is obvious that the 
legislature intended brokerage representation agreements to be in writing and contain a 
nonexclusive and it contains no financial obligation, fee or commission 
due from the party signing the agreement. 
(Emphasis added). The legislature, when it enacted this statute in 2000, subsequent to 
both the codification of LC. § 9-508 and the decision in Central Idaho Agency, added the 
requirement that commission agreements contain a legally enforceable descriptioil of 
property, as detailed in LC. 54-2050(1)(b). 
What CPM is effectively attempting to do is to have this Court render the 
language of I.C. § 54-2050(1)(b) void, and to give it no legal effect. "It is well 
r established that statutes should be inte~preted to mean what the legislature intended them 
' to mean." Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corporation of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 268, 
3 
629 P.2d 662, 664 (1981). "[Qt is incumbent upon [the Supreme] Court to give a statute 
I- 
an interpretation that will not in effect nullify it.. ." Id. (citations omitted). 
This Court in Hartley v. Miller-Stephan stated that it would "assume that the 
' legislature intended what it said in a statute, and [it] will conshue statutory terms 
' / 1 meaning to plainly unambiguous statutory language. 
I 
The Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the issue of a brokerage representation 
the legislature should not now be questioned and the governing law changed to give new 
; I1 agreement being unenforceable due to the lack of a legally enforceable description 
i subsequent to its ruling in Central Idaho Agency, which CPM is now relying on. ln 
Garner v. Bartschi, both a purchase and sale agreement and a brokerage representation 
I 
agreement were at issue, where the brokerage representation agreement contained a 
I 
property description that solely stated "4565 Nounan Road, County Bear Lake, City 
Nounan, Zip 83254, legally described as approx. 500 acres mountain property." 139 
Idaho 430, 434, 80 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2003). The Supreme Court, analyzing the 
requirements of I.C. 5 54-2050(1)(b), stated that brokerage representation agreements are 
required to be in writing and "contain a legally enforceable description of the property." 
Garner at 1037. The Court found lhat the description contained in the brokerage 
representation agreement at issue in Garner was "not a 'legally enforceable description of 
the property' as required by LC. § 54-2050(1)(b) and LC. 5 9-503." Id. 
The trial court, as in Garner, analyzed the enforceability of the Agreements 
pursuant to I.C. 5 54-2050(1)(b) and found that the legal descriptions contained in the 
Agreements were not enforceable and thus did not coinply with that statute. The trial 
conit further made mention of the fact that the Agreements did not comply with the 
statute of frauds. The fact that the trial court simply made mention of LC. 5 9-503 does 
not inem that either court intended that to be the controlling statute. 
It is immaterial whether the ti-ial court applied I.C. 5 9-503 or 5 9-508. 1.C. 5 54- 
2050 postdates both of those code sections and was obviously created to require 
additional information to be present on a comnission agreement; that is, in addition to 
Lhe requirement that the commission agreement being in writing. I.C. § 9-508 merely 
lddresses one of the requirements that I.C. § 54-2050 addresses. Where there is a general 
statute, and a special or specific statute, dealing with the same subject, the provisions of 
:he special or specific statute will control those of the general statute. State v. Roderick, 
35 Idal~o 80, 84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962) (citations omitted). LC. 5 9-508 simply 
.equires that commission agreements be in wliting; whereas I.C. $ 54-2050 not only 
.equires that they be in writing, but adds five additional requirements, including that they 
:ontain a legally enforceable description of the property. I.C. § 9-508 is a generalized 
iersion of LC. 54-2050, therefore rendering the latter the controlling statute for 
mrposes of this appeal. 
Even if it were not immaterial and the trial court was incorrect in analyzing LC. 
t-503 instead of LC. $ 9-508, it would be a harmless error and would not change the 
mtcome of chis case. Real estate commission contracts and brokerage agreements are 
equired in the State of Idaho to be written and to contain a valid legal description which 
~ccurately describes the property contemplated in the agreement. If the legislature had 
ntended that there be no require~nent of an enforceable legal description in a cominission 
greement, then they would not have enacted a statute specifically requiring such when a 
tatute was already in effect that required a commission agreement to be in writing. 
There is no dispute that the legal descriptio~ls for the Charter Pointe and Silver 
)aks properties were not attached to the Agreements executed on March 1,2005. In fact, 
le legal description for the properties was not even generated for the properties until 
'age 12 
of LC. 3 54-2050 and were at no time enforceable agreements. 
iii. The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That the Listing 
Agreements Were Unenforceable Due to the Lack o f  Valid and 
Enforceable Legal Description of the Properties 
It is important to note that the Trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
indicated that the summary judgment was being granted because the legal descriptions 
contained on the listing agreements "did not satisfy the statute of frauds and fail[ed] to 
meet the statutory requirements of LC. 5 54-2050(1)(b)." The Court did not specifically 
statc that the listing agreements failed to meet the requirements of I.C. 5 9-503, but 
I 
! 
I simply included reference to that statute when it stated that the Agreements failed to meet 
I the statute of frauds. Thus, CPM's argument that LC. 5 9-508 should be applied rather 
than I.C. 3 9-503 is rendered ineffectual, as both code sections are encompassed within 
the statute of frauds. 
CPM did uot create valid, enforceable legal descriptions pursuant to Idaho law, 
regardless of whether LC. § 9-503 or I.C. 5 9-508 was applied. Pursuant to Idaho law, a 
commission agreement must be in writing and must contain an enforceable legal 
description of the property. The Agreements in question did not contain valid and 
enforceable legal descriptions. In fact, CPM did not even request that a legal description 
of the property be attached until one year and five months after the Agreements were 
executed and litigation between the parties had erupted. Clearly this is not allowed by 
Idaho law. 
Although CPM and Callies further argue that the Agreements do not state "when 
the addendum must be attached to or accompany the printed contract," this argument is in 
after the Agreements had been executed. Therefore, they did not meet the requirements 
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3 
11, Ex. 2, 9% 3-6, Exs. A-B). There is no factual dispute in the record that the legal 
I 
I 
descriptions for Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks were not attached to the listing 
; agreements at the time of execution of the Agreements, nor had they even been created 
error. The Agreements do in fact state that the legal descriptions must accompany the 
II and finalized at the time the Agreements were entered into. Therefore, for the reasons 
? 
original listing; and further state that such description is attached to the listing. (R. Vol. 
discussed above, the Agreements were at all times u~xenforceable for lack of a legally 1 I /  I I enforceable description of the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks properties. 
iv. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Pard and Extrinsic Evidence 
Could Not be Admitted to Supply a Legal Description to the 
Agreements. 
CPM illcorrectly compares the concept of listingbrokerage representation 
agreements with other types of contracts; in that they argue that parol and extrinsic 
II evidence can be admitted to supply a valid and enforceable legal description to the 
Agreements. However, there is a unique difference between these types of coiltractual 
agreements due to statutory requirements related to commissioi~ agreements; specifically, 
the requirement that the agreements contain a valid and enforceable legal description. 
Where a legal description is not included on an agreement which is statutorily required to 
contain a valid and enforceable legal description, parol and extrinsic evidence will not be 
allowed to supply such a legal description to the agreement. Lexington Heights 
Developnzent, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 281, 92 P.3d 526, 531 (2004); 
Garner, 139 Idaho at 435, 80 P.3d at 1036; and Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 142, 100 
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The trial Court cited Lexington Heights in its memorandum decision, stating that 
the general rule that a "legal description would be sufficient 'so long as quantity, identity, 
or boundaries of property call be determined from the face of the instrument."' (R., Vol. 
11, p. 3 11). Therefore, the Court followed Lexington Heights holding that because the 
Agreements did not contain a "street address, acreage designation, or any other adequate 
identification of the boundaries of the property to be conveyed, parol evidence [would] 
not be admitted to supply any of [those] terms." Lexington Heights, 92 P.3d at 531; 
Garner, 139 Idaho at 435,80 P.3d at 1036; and Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 142, 100 
P. 1052, 1054 (1909). 
CPM argues that Lexington Heights and Allen do not apply because they deal with 
real estate purchase and sale agreements and not with commission agreements. 
However, the trial Court only compared these cases with the current dispute at hand, 
utilizing Garner as the controlling precedent for which it ruled that the Agreements were 
unenforceable. Therefore, this argument by CPM is inapplicable. 
Due to the trial court's holding regarding the disallowance of extrinsic evidence to 
provide legal descriptions to the Agreements, where no previous legal descriptions of any 
kind had been attached, the court declined to follow Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. 
Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968). The trial court found that the difference in 
Central Idaho Agency from the case at bar, there was some type of legal description, 
albeit an insufficient description. (R., Vol. 11, p. 313). However, due to the existence of 
some type of description, parol evidence was used to supplement that description, but not 
to provide it in its entirety. (R., Vol. 11, p. 313). 
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issue at hand, as the legal descriptions clearly were uot attached to the Agreements at the 
time of their execution, nor could they have been attached because they had yet to be 
created. In fact, the record clearly shows that the Appellant only requested that the legal 
descriptions be attached to the Agreements in August of 2006, one year and five months 
following the execution of the Agreements, and at no other time. Pursuant to Idaho law, 
CPM cannot now seek to supply a legal description to the Agreements where no legal 
description previously existed. 
Further, as the trial court further stated, Central Idaho Agency was effectively 
overruled by the enactment of the Idaho Real Estate Brokers' License Law, which was 
enacted in 2000; 32 years after the holding in Central Idaho Agency which CPM is now 
relying on to support their position. (R., Vol. TI, p. 313). LC. 5 54-2050(1)(b), the 
controlling statute as to the requirements of a brokerage representation agreement, 
specifically requires that they be in writing and include a legally enforceable legal 
description. Therefore, the trial court: correctly held chat Central Idaho Agency was in 
essence negated by the enactment of LC. 5 54-2001 et seq. and was not precedent for 
t 
these proceedings. 
As such, CPM's argument fails that par01 andlor extrinsic evidence should be 
allowed to supply legal descriptions to the Agreements when legal descriptions were not 
originally affixed as required by both the express language of the Agreements, and by 
This is where the facts in Central Idaho Agency differentiate from the current 
daho law. 
'age 16 
The law regarding the necessity of an enforceable legal descriptiou in listing 
I 
2 
/ I  contracts has evolved over time; this evolution comes full circle to the current state of the 
v. The Trial Court was Correct in Dismissal of  CPM's Claims to 
Recover on the Theories of Quasi Estoppel and the Doctrine o f  Part 
Performaa~ce 
11 law and is important when considering CPM's equitable arguments. CBI provided the 
' Ildistrist court with detailed analysis of this evolution in its summary judgment 
I 
memorandum, but provides a summary version of that history here for the Court's 
3 
I 
convenie~~ce. Initially, Idaho courts required a legally enforceable property description, 
I /  and eliminated the applicability of equitable remedies. such as the doctrine of part 
! //performance. This was eroded by judicial decisions, legislative enactments overruled 
I /  these judicial decisions, aud recently we have judicial acknowledgment that a listing I I contract requires a legally enforceable description of the property that satisfies the statute II of frauds and, furthermore, that equitable defenses do not apply. See Weatherhead v. 
Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 P. 760 (1919), Murphy v. Livesay, 34 Idaho, 793, 197 P. 536 
(1921), Laker Land & Loans v. Nye, 40 Idaho 793,237 P. 630 (1925), Robison v. Frasier, 
1 1  89 Idaho 326. 404 P2d 877 (1965), Central Idaho Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 11 ~ . 2 d  412 (1968), LC. $9-503,I.C. $9-508, I.C. (54-2050 (2000) and Garner v Bartschi, 
/ /  139 Idaho 430.80 P3d  1031 (2003). 
I I In short, the Court has returned to the legal standard stated in Weatherhead: 
[t]o hold that performance takes a claim of this character out of the 
operation of the statute would, in our opinion, leave nothing for the 
statute to operate on. Such construction would render the statute 
useless and meaningless and would be tantamount to saying that 
ally contract for a commission or reward for the finding or 
procuring of a purchaser of the real estate of another is valid, 
though not in writing and not signed by the owner of such real 
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iute, the broker cannot recover under equitable principles. See 41 A.L.R. Zd 905 $31~1. 
estate, which is directly opposite to the expressed will of the 
legislature. 
ee Weatherhead, at 128. 
As noted in 41 A.L.R. 2d 905, the return to Weatherhead places Idaho with the 
iajority of states on this issue regarding com~nission agreements. In particular the 
.eport notes the conclusion of the American Law Institute as supported by the 
estate~nents that a real estate brolcer calnot recover under equity without compliance 
,ith the governing statutes. In particular, the Report cites Restatement, Contracts $ 355 
0, Illustration 7, which states: 
It is provided by statute that a real estate broker shall have no right 
to a commission for making a sale unless he has a contract or 
authority in writing from his principal. A broker who makes a sale 
for his principal without such written contract or authority cannot 
get judgment for the value of his services. 
Furthermore, the Report cites Restatement, Agency $ 468, Comment subsec (2), 
hich states: 
Statutes similar to the one stated in this Subsection are not 
infrequently enacted with reference to contracts with brokers. The 
~nemorandum commonly required under such statutes is one which 
describes the thing to be sold and the terms of compensation. In the 
absence of such a inemorandurn, the employer, although benefited 
by ihe service of the agent who has been orally employed by him, 
is under no duty to give compensation in any form. As stated in 
414 (3), however, unless the principal is willing to make a 
memorandum, the agent is under no duty to perform. 
The Report concludes that cases anply bear out the foregoing conclusions of the 
:statements, and that the overwhelming weight of authority holds that if the broker's 
ting contract does not satisfy a statute providing that a contract for compeilsation or 
mmissions for procuring a purchaser for real property must be in writing, or a lilce 
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CPM argues that regardless of the enforceability of the Agreements, CPM is 
entitled to recovcr cormnissions based upon their alleged reliance on the Agreements. 
However, CPM bad no right to rely on an unenforceable agreement. Idaho law does not 
provide any equitable remedy where the underlying listing agreement is unenforceable. 
For the reasons set forth in Weatherhead, CPM's arguments lack merit. 
1. Quasi Estoppel Does Not Apply Where There is No 
Enforceable Underfying Agreement. 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the 
detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." 
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006) (citing C & G, Inc. v. Canyon 
Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003)). "This doctrine 
applies when: (1) the offellding party took a different position than his or her original 
position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or 
(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent 
position froin one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in." Id.; Thomas 
v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002). "To prove 
quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there must be 
evidence that it would be ui~conscionable to permnit the offending party to assert allegedly 
contrary positions." Id. (citing Thomas, 137 at 357,48 P.3d at 1246). 
"Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel does not require a misrepresentation by 
one party or actual reliance by the other." Medical Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge 
No. 310, Benev. and Protective Order of Elks, 126 Idaho 90, 96, 878 P.2d 789, 795 
(1994) (citing Keesee v. Fetzek, 11 1 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct.App. 1986)). 
2 
3 
1 
' 1 1  Tommerup v Albertsonk Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980) (overruled on other 
gained some advantage for himself, produced some disadvantage to the person seeking 
the estoppel, or induced such party to change his position." Id. III addition it inust be 
5 
j 
unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a 
position which is illcoilsistent with the one in which he accepted a benefit. Id. (citing 
substitute for an agreement between parties." Letturzich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass'n 
141 Idaho 362, 367-368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109-1110 (2005). (citing Smith v. Boise 
Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 (1981)). "Consideration 
includes 'action by the promisee which is bargained for and given in exchange for the 
promise."' Id. (citing Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428 P.2d 524, 526 
(1967)). "It may also consist of a 'detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the 
promisor."' Id. (citing Surety L$e Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 
603,514 P.2d 594,598 (1973)). 
In Lettunich, the court found that although one party had "clearly suffered a 
detriment when he purchased cattle without a way to pay for them ...[ t]he doctrine of 
promissory estoppel [was] of no consequence in [that] case because there [was] evidence 
of adequate consideration. What [was] lacking [was] a sufficiently definite agreement." 
Id. (citing Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Nat'l, 119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d 900, 
907 (1991)). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an enforceable 
agreement, the doctrine of part performance and equitable estoppel did not apply. The 
I 
v 
I 
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grounds)). 
However, "[pjromissory estoppel is siinply a substitute for consideration, not a 
:ou~-t found that "even though it could be inferred that Lettunich partially 
erformed.. .there is no evidence in the record of a complete and enforceable agreement." 
(ettunich at 1109. 
The same is true in these circumstances. Although CPM claims that they partially 
erformed by finding purchasers to enter into purchase and sale agreements for the 
urchase of units in the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks project, and expended funds on 
ke same, there are two fatal flaws to CPM's argument. First, there is no evidence in the 
:cord of the funds purportedly expended by the appellant in reliance on the Agreements. 
zcondly, as explained in detail above, there is no evidence in the record that contradicts 
e fact that no legal description accompanied the Agreements when they were executed 
1 required by both the Agreements and by Idaho statute. Further, CPM failed to put any 
ridence into the record that CBI, Charter Pointe or Silver Oaks were in some way 
sponsible for the fact that the Agreements did not contain valid enforceable legal 
:scriptions. 
Therefore, the lack of factual evidence in the record that supports CPM's claims 
reliance, coupled with the unenforceability of the Agreements, renders CPM's claims 
quasi estoppel and partial performance inapplicable to the current dispute. 
vi. CPM is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the 
Agreements Due to the Unenforceability of the Agreements. 
To the extent that CPM is requesting an award of fees and Costs from the Court 
appeal pursuant to the terms of the Agreements, the Court should deny said request 
e to the unenforceability of the Agreements as explained above. 
I1 There are no disputed facts that would have precluded the trial court from 
1 
2 
1 ( gxanting summary judgment. Summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court 
vii. CBI is Entitled to an Award ~f Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R. 41 
5 
6 
7 
I /  The case of Garner v. Bartsclzi is analogous to the case at hand, and supports an 
and said decision should not be overturned on appeal. Therefore, CBI should recover all 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred as the prevailing party on appeal. 
8 
9 
viii. The Court Should Award CBI Reasonable Attorney Fees and Costs 
Incurred in this Appeal, Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, Idaho Code 
9 12-120(3) and Idaho Code 9 12-121. 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or co~~tract relating to the purchase 
or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs. 
1 
? 
3 
' I16'The award of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
award of attorney fees and costs to Respondent incurred in responding to this appeal. 
Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) states: 
I I comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under LC. 5 
I 
I 
I I 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the 
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction 
I1 basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Garner at 1040 (citing Brower v. 11 E.I. DuPont De Nernouurs & Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P2d 345, 349 (1990)), 
11 The Court in Garner cited Hilbert v Hough, 132 Idaho 203, 207, 969 P.2d 836, 
840 (Ct.App.1998), stating that "[ilt is of no consequence that the underlying contractual 
obligation is unenforceable. A prevailing party may recover attorney fees even though 
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no liability under a contract was established or where no contract was, in fact, ever 
formed." Garner at 1040. Here, like in Garner, the Agreements contain language in 
Paragraph 23 of the Agreements, which states: 
"[iln the event either party shall initiate any suit or actio11 or appeal on any 
matter relating to this Agreement h e  defaulting party shall pay the 
prevailing party all damages and expenses resulting from the default, 
including all reasonably attorneys' fees and all court costs and all other 
expenses incurred by the prevailing party." 
:R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, ¶¶ 3,5, EXS. A-B). 
As in Garner, due to the fact that the commercial transaction was the gravamen of 
he lawsuit, and although unenforceable, the Agreements provide for an award of 
~ttorney's fees to the prevailing party, CBI should be awarded their attorney's fees and 
:osts for defending this appeal 
Further, attorney's fees are to be awarded if the Court finds, from the facts 
)resented to it "that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously unreasoiiably 
a without foundation." See Idaho Code $ 12-121. Clearly this appeal was brought 
rivolonsly, as the Agreements clearly were unenforceable, and therefore, CBI should be 
ntitled to ail award of attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. $ 12-121. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the well established legal principles governing this case, and the facts 
I record, there is simply no identifiable error by the trial court in the proceedings 
icident to the grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, there is no legal authority for 
verturning grant of summary judgment. The Court should entirely affirm the decisions 
F the trial court. 
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Additionally, for the reasons set forth above, the facts and circumstances of this 
ppeal certainly seem to warrant an award of attorney fees and costs to CBI for the 
xpenses they have incurred in responding to the appeal. CBI therefore respectfully 
:quests leave to submit a memorandum of costs and fees in accord with IAR 40 and 41 
pon issuance of a decision by the Court. 
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